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REASON AND AUTHORITY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
JAMES A. GRANT 
 
ABSTRACT. In judicial review of administrative action, the pivotal 
distinction between decisions about “jurisdiction” (for the reviewing 
court) and “the merits of the case” (for the administrative decision 
maker) is a source of much confusion. This article argues that 
jurisdiction should be understood as the scope of legitimate 
authority, the best theory of which is Joseph Raz’s service 
conception of authority. As well as explaining how to determine 
jurisdiction, this article explains that a legitimate authority’s intra-
vires decision “pre-empts” the reviewing court’s judgment on the 
merits, and that the concept of jurisdiction precludes any standard of 
reasonableness for reviewing a legitimate authority.  
 
KEYWORDS: judicial review, administrative law, legitimate authority, 
Joseph Raz, ultra vires, jurisdiction, reasonableness, deference. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
How can a court review administrative action, without trespassing on 
the administrative decision maker’s authority? No one thinks that the 
courts should substitute their judgment on all matters, intervening in 
administrative decision making merely because they think a decision 
is wrong. We would not be better governed if judges in judicial 
review had the final say over all governmental decisions. But when 
should the courts substitute their judgment? Which decisions are 
better settled by judges? 
One standard way of framing the answer to these questions is 
to say that the courts should only intervene to correct “jurisdictional” 
errors, and should leave decisions about the “merits of the case” to 
the administrative decision maker. But that simply raises the 
question: what counts as a jurisdictional error? This question is a 
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source of much confusion and disagreement among public lawyers. 
Many resist drawing the distinction between jurisdiction and merits 
at all, viewing it as unduly “formalistic” or “analytical”, which at 
best has little practical use and at worst obscures the real issues.1 
Formalism is not necessarily a bad thing, for there is value in having 
authoritative legal rules that can be applied without the need for the 
moral and political evaluation that the rules were meant to settle.2 
But I think it is a misunderstanding of the concept of jurisdiction to 
criticise or defend it on the basis of its alleged formalism.  
Jurisdiction should be recognised as the core concept in 
judicial review of administrative action. This article explains what 
jurisdiction is and why it matters. The article adopts an analytical 
approach, but one that sees analytical reasoning as only a preliminary 
stage in identifying jurisdictional errors, which is an exercise in 
practical reasoning. The main argument is that jurisdiction should be 
understood as the scope of the legitimate authority of the decision 
maker. To explain what that means, the article draws on Joseph 
Raz’s influential (but, among public lawyers, much neglected) work 
in analytical philosophy on the nature of authority. On this 
understanding, the question of jurisdiction in administrative law is: 
over which matters would the court be more likely to conform with 
reason if it treated the administrative agency’s decision as binding 
than if it followed its own judgment? This understanding has 
important consequences for administrative law, three of which are 
worth highlighting at the outset.  
First, jurisdiction is not determined merely by interpreting 
authoritative legal sources. Acting in excess of jurisdiction, or “ultra 
                                                     
1 See, e.g., T.R.S. Allan, “Doctrine and Theory in Administrative Law: An Elusive 
Quest for the Limits of Jurisdiction” [2003] P.L. 429; Paul Craig, Administrative 
Law, 7th edn (London 2012), 476–80; Michael Taggart, ‘The Contribution of Lord 
Cooke to Scope of Review Doctrine in Administrative Law: A Comparative 
Common Law Perspective’ in Paul Rishworth (ed.), The Struggle for Simplicity in 
the Law: Essays in Honour of Lord Cooke of Thorndon (Wellington 1997), 213; 
Rebecca Williams, “When Is an Error Not an Error? Reform of Jurisdictional 
Review of Error of Law and Fact” [2007] P.L. 793; Matthew Lewans, 
Administrative Law and Judicial Deference (Oxford 2016), 44–45; T.T. Arvind 
and Lindsay Stirton, “The Curious Origins of Judicial Review” (2017) 133 L.Q.R. 
91, 96. 
2 Christopher Forsyth, “Showing the Fly the Way Out of the Flybottle: The Value 
of Formalism and Conceptual Reasoning in Administrative Law” [2007] C.L.J. 
325. On the distinction between formal and substantive reasoning, see P.S. Atiyah 
and R.S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law (Oxford 1987). 
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vires” (beyond the powers), is sometimes understood to mean 
“without legal authorisation”,3 and in relation to statutory powers, 
“beyond the powers that Parliament intended to confer”. But 
authoritative legal sources do not fully determine jurisdiction; they 
do not specify all the limits of a decision maker’s powers. To work 
out what those unspecified limits are, this article argues, we need to 
determine the limits of the decision maker’s legitimate authority. The 
distinction between legal authority and legitimate authority—and so 
between error of law and excess of jurisdiction—explains why the 
distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional questions of 
law, although unpopular, is intelligible and important.  
Secondly, intra-vires decisions of a legitimate authority are 
morally binding on their subjects, including the courts,4 and the law 
should reflect this. That is, when a legitimate authority acts within its 
jurisdiction, its decision “pre-empts” the court’s judgment of the 
merits of the case. I explain that claim more fully below, but for the 
moment suffice it to say that the reasons for a court to defer to a 
decision maker’s legitimate authority are not reasons that should be 
“accorded appropriate weight” and added to the balance with all the 
other reasons.5 They are reasons that can be overridden only if, on 
some particular issue, the decision maker no longer has legitimate 
authority over that issue, and instead the court has a greater claim to 
legitimate authority. While the courts and commentators often pay 
lip service to “due deference” or similar notions of respect for 
authority, they mostly do not sufficiently respect the pre-emptiveness 
of legitimate authority. 
Thirdly, the standard of reasonableness—even with the high 
threshold that Lord Greene M.R. tried to articulate in the notorious 
Wednesbury case—cannot be a legitimate test for determining when 
a court should intervene in administrative decision making; that is, it 
                                                     
3 The classic on the requirement for legal authority is Entick v Carrington (1765) 
19 St. Tr. 1029, 1066. For discussion of this case and its significance, see Adam 
Tomkins and Paul Scott (eds), Entick v Carrington: 250 Years of the Rule of Law 
(Oxford 2015). 
4 It might seem dubious to claim that judges are among the “subjects” of 
administrative authorities, but the account of legitimate authority defended in this 
article makes that claim more plausible. The courts are subjects of administrative 
authorities when the latter has a greater claim to legitimate authority than the 
former. 
5 Cf. Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11, 
[2007] 2 A.C. 167, at [16], per Lord Bingham of Cornhill 
This is an Accepted Manuscript, which may not include final edits. 
The final version will be published in (2017) 76 Cambridge Law 
Journal 
 
4 
cannot be a test for jurisdiction.6 It is widely accepted, as it must be 
accepted, that reasonableness review involves some assessment of 
the merits of the decision. Over recent decades, much ink has been 
spilt debating the extent to which there should be a variable intensity 
of review of the merits, usually said to range from “Wednesbury 
reasonableness”, to a more intensive reasonableness standard, to 
proportionality and correctness.7 But that debate largely misses the 
point. These standards all entail the same thing: that a court should 
intervene when the decision maker acts for a defeated reason (i.e., 
acts unreasonably, disproportionately, or incorrectly), and not when 
the decision maker acts for an undefeated reason (bearing in mind 
that there will often be undefeated reasons for a range of different 
decisions, all of which are therefore reasonable, and none of which is 
uniquely correct).8 But, according to the theory of legitimate 
authority defended in this article, when the decision maker has 
legitimate authority over the courts, the courts should not be in the 
business of deciding whether the decision maker has acted for a 
defeated reason (unless, perhaps, the decision maker has made a 
clear mistake).9 
The structure of this article is as follows. Section II examines, 
in some detail, a case that highlights many aspects of the problem of 
jurisdiction in judicial review, which provides a concrete example 
that can be used in the more abstract discussion that follows. Section 
III presents the core of the argument of this article, building on Raz’s 
theory of legitimate authority to explain how jurisdiction should be 
                                                     
6 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B. 
223, C.A. As we shall see in Section V below, Lord Greene and many others have 
treated reasonableness review as a test for jurisdiction.  
7 See Hanna Wilberg and Mark Elliott (eds), The Scope and Intensity of 
Substantive Review: Traversing Taggart’s Rainbow (Oxford 2015). 
8 John Gardner, “The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person” (2015) 131 L.Q.R. 
563, 566–67. See also Neil MacCormick, “Reasonableness and Objectivity” (1999) 
74 Notre Dame Law Review 1575; John Gardner, “The Mysterious Case of the 
Reasonable Person” (2001) 51 U.T.L.J. 273. 
9 The failure to understand this point about legitimate authority is the central flaw 
in Matthew Lewans’s defence on judicial deference on the basis of the legitimate 
authority of the administrative agency: see, e.g., Lewans, Administrative Law and 
Judicial Deference, note 1 above, p.13: “[J]udges should respect or defer to 
administrative decisions which are fair and reasonable, instead of substituting their 
interpretation of the law when it deviates from the substance of an administrative 
decision.” 
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determined and the pre-emptive effect of legitimate authority. 
Section IV examines the consequences of this argument for judicial 
review of error of law. Finally, Section V examines the consequences 
for reasonableness review. 
 
II. CORNER HOUSE AS A CASE STUDY 
 
The problem of jurisdiction—and so the central problem of judicial 
review—can be best illustrated by analysing a concrete case, to 
which I can refer throughout the more theoretical discussion in this 
article. The case I have chosen is R. (Corner House Research) v 
Director of the Serious Fraud Office.10 In July 2004, the Director of 
the Serious Fraud Office, exercising a power conferred on him by 
section 1(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1987,11 started a criminal 
investigation into allegations of corruption against BAE Systems plc, 
in connection with a valuable arms contract between the United 
Kingdom and Saudi Arabia. The Director resisted protests from BAE 
and the Government that the investigation should be stopped because 
it would jeopardise the UK’s commercial and diplomatic relations 
with Saudi Arabia. However, in late 2006, the UK Government—
including the Prime Minister personally—warned the Director and 
the Attorney General that Saudi officials were threatening to 
withdraw counterterrorism cooperation with the UK if the 
investigation continued, which, the Government alleged, would have 
severe consequences for the UK’s national security: “British lives on 
British streets were at risk”. In view of these threats, on 14 December 
2006, the Director announced his decision to stop the investigation. 
The claimants sought judicial review of the decision to stop 
the investigation. They were initially successful in the Divisional 
Court, but ultimately lost in the House of Lords. As we shall see, the 
reasoning of the judges in both courts was insufficient to justify their 
respective conclusions, and their inadequacies are instructive for our 
purpose in examining the problem of jurisdiction. 
The Divisional Court’s judgment, written by Moses L.J., 
emphasised the threat to the integrity of the UK’s criminal justice 
                                                     
10 R. (Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2008] 
EWHC 714 (Admin), [2009] 1 A.C. 756; R. (Corner House Research) v Director 
of the Serious Fraud Office [2008] UKHL 60, [2009] 1 A.C. 756. 
11 Criminal Justice Act 1987, s. 1(3): “The Director may investigate any suspected 
offence which appears to him on reasonable grounds to involve serious or complex 
fraud.” 
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system and the rule of law caused by surrendering to the threat from 
the Saudis. Moses L.J. conceded that the Director had a very wide 
discretion when deciding whether to investigate, and the courts 
should be most reluctant to interfere.12 In exercising his discretion, 
the Director was entitled to take into account the risk to national 
security.13 Neither the Director nor the court was in a position to 
reach an independent judgment on the risk to national security, and 
so the Director “may lawfully accord appropriate weight to the 
judgment of those with responsibility for national security who have 
direct access to sources of intelligence unavailable to him”.14  
But the fact that the threat was not only to national security, 
but also to the legal system, entailed, according to the Divisional 
Court, that “the issue is no longer a matter only for Government” but 
also for the courts.15 Relying on what he regarded as “well settled 
principles of public law”, Moses L.J. stated: “The rationale for the 
court’s intervention is its responsibility to protect the rule of law.”16 
More concretely, two main reasons for the court’s intervention were 
given. One of these reasons was that, notwithstanding the need to 
accord “appropriate weight” to the judgment of others, the Director 
had “surrendered” his judgment to a third party: “In yielding to the 
threat, the Director ceased to exercise the power to make the 
judgment conferred on him by Parliament.”17 But that is 
unpersuasive: there is simply no basis for concluding that the 
Director did not himself come to the judgment that the risk to 
national security (as explained by those with knowledge of that risk) 
outweighed the public interest in continuing the investigation.  
The other, potentially compelling, reason for the Divisional 
Court’s intervention was its claim that the Director and the 
                                                     
12 Corner House [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin), at [50]–[53]. See also R. 
(Bermingham) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2006] EWHC 200, [2007] 
Q.B. 727, at [64], per Laws L.J.: “it will take a wholly exceptional case on its legal 
merits to justify a judicial review of a discretionary decision by the Director to 
investigate or not.” 
13 Corner House [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin), at [53]. 
14 Corner House [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin), at [54], citing Huang v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11, [2007] 2 A.C. 167, at [16], per 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill. 
15 Corner House [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin), at [56]–[59]. 
16 Corner House [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin), at [59]. 
17 Corner House [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin), at [67]. 
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Government had yielded too readily to the threat and sacrificed the 
rule of law, and that it was for the court to make that assessment.18 
Relatedly, Moses L.J. also criticised the Director and the 
Government for “never properly” taking into account a relevant 
consideration, namely, the damage to the rule of law caused by 
giving in to threats; however, the better description is that the 
Director did take that consideration into account, even though he 
regarded it as having been outweighed by competing 
considerations.19 The main reason for the Divisional Court’s 
judgment is that, in its view, the rule of law should be sacrificed only 
if the court is satisfied that it is necessary. Moses L.J. “identified” the 
following principle: “submission to a threat is lawful only when it is 
demonstrated to a court that there was no alternative course open to 
the decision-maker”.20 The Government could not point to any 
“specific, immediate threat” to the life of anyone, and the Divisional 
Court was not satisfied that the Director and the Government had 
done all that could reasonably be done to resist the threat.21  
The flaw in the Divisional Court’s reasoning is that it did not 
adequately explain why the threat to the rule of law justified the 
court’s intervention. To be justified, the court needed—but failed—
to explain why the court’s decision should be substituted for both the 
judgment of the Director, to whom Parliament allocated 
responsibility, and the judgment of the Government, to whom “[i]n a 
case touching foreign relations and national security the duty of 
decision on the merits is assigned,” as Moses L.J. put it, by the 
                                                     
18 Corner House [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin), at [83]. See also R. v Coventry City 
Council, ex parte Phoenix Aviation [1995] 3 All E.R. 37, at 62, per Simon Brown 
L.J. (emphasis added): “Tempting though it may be for public authorities to yield 
too readily to threats of disruption, they must expect the courts to review any such 
decision with particular rigour … As when fundamental human rights are in play, 
the courts will adopt a more interventionist role.” Simon Brown L.J. went on to 
decide Corner House in the House of Lords, and distinguished this case: see 
[2008] UKHL 60, at [58], per Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. 
19 Corner House [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin), at [91]–[93]. 
20 Corner House [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin), at [98]. 
21 Corner House [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin), at [80]–[86], [170]. Moses L.J. 
believed that one alternative would have been “to explain that the attempt to halt 
the investigation by making threats could not, by law, succeed”: ibid., at para. 
[101]. But that was not correct on Moses L.J.’s own view of the law. On that view, 
the threat would have succeeded if the Saudis could not be dissuaded from 
pursuing the threat. 
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“separation of power between the executive and the courts”.22 While 
expressing scepticism about the alleged risk to national security,23 
Moses L.J. acknowledged that the court could not assess that risk.24 
But given that acknowledgment, why did he reach the conclusion 
that the court could better assess whether an alternative course was 
available and, moreover, whether that alternative should be taken by 
the Director? As we will see, the argument of this article entails that 
the Divisional Court’s decision could be justified only if protecting 
the rule of law is so important that it matters more than getting the 
national security assessment right. 
The House of Lords unanimously overturned the Divisional 
Court’s judgment. According to Lord Bingham of Cornhill, the 
principle relied on by the Divisional Court—the principle “that 
submission to a threat is lawful only when it is demonstrated to a 
court that there was no alternative course open to the decision-
maker”—was “novel and unsupported by authority”.25 Moreover, the 
principle was objectionable because:  
 
it distracts attention from what, applying well-settled 
principles of public law, was the right question: 
whether, in deciding that the public interest in 
pursuing an important investigation into alleged 
bribery was outweighed by the public interest in 
protecting the lives of British citizens, the Director 
made a decision outside the lawful bounds of the 
discretion entrusted to him by Parliament.26 
 
Baroness Hale of Richmond said that the “only question” for the 
court was whether it was lawful for the Director to take into account 
the Saudis’ threat and the resulting risk to British lives. “Put like 
that,” Baroness Hale explained, “it is difficult to reach any other 
                                                     
22 Corner House [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin), at [55]. 
23 Corner House [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin), at [100]: noting that it suited the 
Government’s commercial and diplomatic interests to stop the investigation, 
Moses L.J. suggested that “too ready a submission may give rise to the suspicion 
that the threat was not the real ground for the decision at all; rather it was a useful 
pretext.” 
24 Corner House [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin), at [54]. 
25 Corner House [2008] UKHL 60, at [38]. 
26 Corner House [2008] UKHL 60, at [38]. 
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conclusion than that it was indeed lawful for him to take this into 
account.”27 The Director had also given “prolonged and profound 
thought to the implications for the rule of law” in giving in to the 
threat.28 The House of Lords held that it was not for the court, but for 
the Director on the advice of others with expert knowledge, to assess 
the balance of all the relevant considerations. 
The reasoning of the House of Lords was inadequate because 
it did not seriously engage with the claim that the rule of law 
deserved special protection from the court in the face of the threat, 
such that the court could substitute its judgment on the necessity of 
submitting to the threat, notwithstanding the “appropriate weight” 
given to the judgment of others, including those with greater 
knowledge of the threat to lives. Lord Bingham went so far as to say 
that upholding the Director’s decision “involves no affront to the rule 
of law”,29 which overlooks the sound point that the damage to the 
rule of law was one of the considerations against stopping the 
investigation, which the Director took into account. If the 
deficiencies in the reasoning of both courts are remedied, what 
should have been the court’s decision? The purpose of this article is 
not to answer that question—though it will make the Divisional 
Court’s judgment more difficult to justify—but rather to explain the 
analytical framework in which it ought to be answered. 
 
III. LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 
 
An agency’s jurisdiction is the scope of its authority to decide. The 
main argument of this article is that a decision should be understood 
as being within an administrative decision maker’s jurisdiction if that 
decision maker has legitimate authority to decide. The question then 
becomes: what is legitimate authority? Joseph Raz’s work in 
analytical philosophy has provided one of the most influential and 
compelling answers to that question. Yet the influence of Raz’s 
theory has not reached most public lawyers. While public lawyers 
have often engaged with (though have less often accepted) Raz’s 
                                                     
27 Corner House [2008] UKHL 60, at [52]–[53]. 
28 Corner House [2008] UKHL 60, at [58], per Lord Brown of Eaton-under-
Heywood, distinguishing his judgment in Phoenix Aviation [1995] 3 All E.R. 37, at 
62, which was relied on by the Divisional Court: see note 18 above. 
29 Corner House [2008] UKHL 60, at [41]. 
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writings on the ideal of the rule of law,30 they have taken insufficient 
advantage of the insights in his work on legitimate authority.31 These 
two strands of his work, on the rule of law and on legitimate 
authority, stand on their own, and it would be wrong to reject one 
because of the other. The aim of this section is to show that, even if 
Raz’s theory of legitimate authority may be, in parts, underdeveloped 
or flawed, it is nonetheless one of the richest, most developed 
sources from which to reflect further on the notions of legitimate 
authority and jurisdiction. 
 
A. The Justification of Authority 
 
Raz began his exploration of the idea of authority by highlighting the 
apparent paradox of legitimate authority, the alleged incompatibility 
between reason and authority. He wrote: 
 
To be subjected to authority, it is argued, is 
incompatible with reason, for reason requires that one 
should always act on the balance of reasons of which 
one is aware. It is of the nature of authority that it 
requires submission even when one thinks that what is 
required is against reason. Therefore, submission to 
authority is irrational.32 
 
Raz set out to explain why, despite this apparent paradox, reason and 
authority are compatible, and legitimate authority is possible: there 
                                                     
30 See Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law and its Virtue” in his The Authority of Law: 
Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford 1979). See further Paul Craig, “Formal and 
Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework” [1997] 
P.L. 467; James A. Grant, “The Ideals of the Rule of Law” (2017) 37 O.J.L.S. 383. 
31 Remarkably, even studies offering a theory of deference in administrative law 
(e.g., Paul Daly, A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law (Cambridge 2012)) 
are written without any reference to Raz’s theory. A recent exception is Matthew 
Lewans; however, Lewans rejects Raz’s arguments on the basis of 
misunderstandings about those arguments, as I discuss below. This 
misunderstanding is also demonstrated in the distinction he draws between 
jurisdiction and legitimate authority: see, e.g., Lewans, Administrative Law and 
Judicial Deference, note 1 above, p. 2: “instead of focusing our attention on 
jurisdictional parameters, we should ask more directly whether administrative 
officials have legitimate authority to interpret the law”. 
32 Joseph Raz, “Legitimate Authority” in his The Authority of Law, note 30 above, 
p. 3. 
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can be reasons not to act on one’s own judgment of the balance of 
reasons, and instead to follow another’s judgment. 
Raz’s theory of authority, which he called the “service 
conception of authority”, received its fullest discussion in The 
Morality of Freedom. There, he set out three conditions that must be 
satisfied for an authority’s claim to legitimacy to be justified. The 
first condition is the “dependence thesis”, according to which “all 
authoritative directives should be based on reasons which already 
independently apply to the subjects of the directives and are relevant 
to their action in the circumstances covered by the directive”.33 Raz 
calls these reasons “dependent reasons”—or, in the language of 
judicial review, we might call them relevant considerations and 
proper purposes. In Corner House, the relevant considerations 
included the public interests in protecting the rule of law and public 
safety, but if the threat had been directed to the Director’s personal 
safety, his personal safety would have been an irrelevant 
consideration, as were commercial interests.34 The authority must act 
on the same considerations that its subjects should have relied on if 
left to make the decision themselves. That is not to say that 
authorities should necessarily act in the interests of their subjects. 
They should act on the basis of what it is objectively valuable for 
their subjects to do, whether or not that coincides with their 
interests.35  
Raz’s second condition of legitimate authority is the “normal 
justification thesis”: 
 
The normal and primary way to establish that a person 
should be acknowledged to have authority over 
another person involves showing that the alleged 
subject is likely better to comply with reasons which 
apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative 
directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged 
authority as authoritatively binding, and tries to 
                                                     
33 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford 1986), 47. See also Joseph Raz, 
“Authority, Law and Morality” in his Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the 
Morality of Law and Politics, rev. edn (Oxford 1994), 214. 
34 Corner House [2008] UKHL 60, at [53], per Baroness Hale of Richmond. 
35 On values and interests, see Timothy Macklem and John Gardner, “Value, 
Interest, and Well-Being” (2006) 18 Utilitas 362. 
This is an Accepted Manuscript, which may not include final edits. 
The final version will be published in (2017) 76 Cambridge Law 
Journal 
 
12 
follow them, than if he tries to follow the reasons 
which apply to him directly.36 
 
These two conditions explain why Raz calls his theory a service 
conception of authority: a legitimate authority provides a service to 
its subjects by helping them to conform better with reason than they 
would otherwise have done if they followed their own judgment.  
The subjects of an authority include all those who would 
better conform with reason by treating the authority’s decision as 
authoritatively binding. In the context of judicial review, where the 
courts would better conform with reason by following the decision of 
an administrative official, the courts are among the subjects of that 
official’s legitimate authority—a claim about which I will say more 
at the end of this section. In Corner House, both the Director and the 
courts were subject to the legitimate authority of the Government in 
respect of the risk to public safety caused by the threat, if the 
Government had better knowledge of that risk, and the Director and 
the courts would therefore comply better with reason by following 
the Government’s assessment of the risk to public safety. But that 
would not entail that the Government had legitimate authority on the 
balance to be struck between public safety and other values. One 
consequence of Raz’s theory is that legitimate authority is piecemeal. 
A legitimate authority will help some people conform better with 
reason on some matters, namely those matters regarding which the 
normal justification condition is satisfied. 
The normal justification thesis faces an objection that is 
especially important when thinking about its relevance to 
administrative law. The objection comes from those who argue that 
the normal justification thesis is concerned only with outcomes—
with whether the authority serves the instrumental value of getting 
the right answer—and not with procedures, the way in which the 
outcomes are reached.37 Those making this objection point out, 
                                                     
36 Raz, “Authority, Law and Morality”, note 33 above, p. 214. See also Raz, The 
Morality of Freedom, note 33 above, p. 53. 
37 This objection is made by, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, “Authority for Officials” in 
Lukas H. Meyer, Stanley L. Paulson, and Thomas W. Pogge (eds), Rights, Culture 
and the Law: Themes from the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz 
(Oxford 2003), 64–69; Scott Hershovitz, “Legitimacy, Democracy, and Razian 
Authority” (2003) 9 Legal Theory 201, 218–19; Samantha Besson, “Democracy, 
Law and Authority” (2005) 2 Journal of Moral Philosophy 89. This objection is 
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rightly, that sometimes the way in which an institutional settlement 
has been arrived at—say, through publicly recognised procedures—
matters more than getting the settlement right. If it were true that we 
should be concerned only with outcomes, then in Corner House the 
fact that section 1(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 empowered 
the Director of the Serious Fraud Office to decide whether to 
investigate would be irrelevant; all that would matter for the court in 
judicial review would be whether the Director or the court is better 
able to reach the right decision. A judge would not need to be 
concerned with the settled legal allocation of power among 
institutions and the procedures, including the democratic legitimacy 
of the procedures, that empower and constrain the administrative 
decision maker.  
This proceduralist objection is based on a misunderstanding 
of the normal justification thesis. The objection takes an overly 
restrictive view of what counts as dependent reasons in the Razian 
account, so that they exclude the values that procedures can secure.38 
But Raz’s service conception of authority can accommodate these 
procedural considerations. For example, although he adopts a critical 
perspective on democratic institutions, Raz accepts that democratic 
institutions are capable of having an intrinsic value that can satisfy 
the normal justification condition, a value arising from “their ability 
to give expression to people’s standing as free, autonomous 
agents”.39 The normal justification condition is about maximising 
conformity with reason, including the reasons stemming from 
democratic or other procedural values. 
However, critics argue that the normal justification thesis can 
include democratic and other procedural justifications only at the 
cost of making the thesis “nearly empty”, because it would subsume 
any theory of legitimacy; indeed, satisfaction of the normal 
justification thesis would become a consequence of the authority’s 
legitimacy, rather than a ground of it.40 The problem, it is said, is that 
                                                     
also adopted in Lewans, Administrative Law and Judicial Deference, note 1 above, 
pp. 194–95.  
38 For a defence of this conclusion, see Timothy Macklem, Law and Life in 
Common (Oxford 2015), 114–15. 
39 Joseph Raz, “The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception” in 
his Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical 
Reason (Oxford 2009), 153. 
40 Scott Hershovitz, “The Role of Authority” (2011) 7 Philosophers’ Imprint 1, 5. 
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if the normal justification condition can be satisfied by a prior duty to 
obey democratic institutions, then it seems to be that prior duty, and 
not the normal justification thesis, that explains why the authority’s 
claim to legitimacy is justified. 
But I think the normal justification thesis can incorporate 
democratic and other procedural justifications without losing its 
explanatory force. It recognises that there are many reasons why we 
might better conform with reason by following an authority’s 
decision: for example, because the authority has greater expertise, or 
because deciding for oneself is too burdensome, or because we have 
a greater interest in coordinating our action for the common good, or 
because making a decision in accordance with certain procedures, 
including democratic procedures, is more valuable than deciding for 
oneself. In cases involving democratic legitimacy, the normal 
justification thesis continues to do significant work, capturing the 
idea that democratic procedures are never sufficient for legitimacy; 
the reasons for deciding democratically must outweigh the reasons 
for deciding oneself. In Corner House, the 1987 Act gave the court a 
procedural reason to follow the Director’s decision, but that is not to 
say that the normal justification condition is satisfied, for this 
procedural reason could be defeated by competing reasons for the 
court to decide itself. 
 
B. The Pre-emptiveness of Authority 
 
The third condition of Raz’s service conception of authority is the 
“pre-emption thesis”, which explains the binding force of a 
legitimate authority’s decision and its effect on its subjects’ practical 
reasoning. It is the pre-emption thesis that helps to explain why the 
court in judicial review should not intrude on the merits of the case. 
The pre-emption thesis is as follows: 
 
[T]he fact that an authority requires performance of an 
action is a reason for its performance which is not to 
be added to all other relevant reasons when assessing 
what to do, but should exclude and take the place of 
some of them.41 
 
                                                     
41 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, note 33 above, p. 46. See also Raz, “Authority, 
Law and Morality”, note 33 above, p. 214. 
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“The whole point and purpose of authorities,” he says, “is to pre-
empt individual judgment on the merits of a case”.42 According to 
Raz, the pre-emptive reasons that a legitimate authority’s decisions 
provide are what he elsewhere calls second-order “exclusionary 
reasons”, which exclude some (but not all) of the first-order reasons 
its subjects should otherwise have acted on.43 The legitimate 
authority’s subjects should not act for “excluded reasons”—which 
we can call the merits of the case—because these are the reasons that 
the authority was meant to settle, and the authority’s subjects would 
better conform with reason if they follow the authority’s judgment on 
those reasons.44 
From the point of view of the Director and the courts in 
Corner House, the reasons for and against concluding that there was 
a severe risk to national security by continuing the investigation may 
be be excluded reasons, on this Razian account. Due to its greater 
expertise on this question, the Government’s conclusion that there 
was a severe risk to national security should be treated as having 
settled that question. But that should not be treated as having settled 
the question of whether to investigate, which the statute allocated to 
the Director. If this statutory authorisation gave him legitimate 
authority to settle the wider question of how the severe risk to 
national security should be weighed against the reasons for 
continuing the investigation, then the courts, on the Razian 
exclusionary model, should treat the Director’s decision as having 
settled the balance of those reasons. Those reasons are therefore 
excluded for the courts; they are the merits of the case and the courts 
should not interfere for excluded reasons. 
But in that case, when would the courts be justified in 
interfering with the Director’s decision? According to Raz, the pre-
emptive reasons for following a legitimate authority’s decision can 
                                                     
42 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, note 33 above, p. 47–48. 
43 Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms ([1975], Oxford 1999), 46. 
44 Raz sometimes describes the excluded reasons as the “conflicting reasons ... that 
the law-maker was meant to consider before issuing the directive”: Raz, “The 
Problem of Authority”, note 39 above, p. 144 (emphasis added). Two points are 
worth raising: first, the idea that the excluded reasons are only conflicting reasons 
is contestable; and secondly, the excluded reasons are perhaps better described as 
those the authority was meant to settle, which may be narrower than those it was 
meant to consider. See further Stephen Perry, “Political Authority and Political 
Obligation” in Leslie Green and Brian Leiter (eds), Oxford Studies in Philosophy 
of Law: Volume 2 (Oxford 2013), 45. 
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be defeated only by “non-excluded” reasons—that is, the reasons that 
the authority was not meant to settle, because the subject would 
better conform with reason by following their own judgment on 
those reasons. He writes: 
 
Even where an authoritative decision is meant finally 
to settle what is to be done it may be open to 
challenge on certain grounds, e.g. if an emergency 
occurs, or if the directive violates fundamental human 
rights, or if the authority acted arbitrarily. The non-
excluded reasons and the grounds for challenging an 
authority’s directives vary from case to case. They 
determine the conditions of legitimacy of the 
authority and the limits of its rightful power.45 
 
In Corner House, if the risk of undermining the rule of law was a 
non-excluded reason—in the sense that its relevance makes the court 
better placed to make the decision—then the Divisional Court may 
have been justified in substituting its judgment for the Director’s, so 
long as the risk to the rule of law outweighed all the other 
considerations. The notion that the threat to the rule of law was a 
reason of this kind is what led Jeffrey Jowell to find it “surprising” 
that the House of Lords in Corner House “positively encourages the 
view that the rule of law is on par with any other ‘relevant 
consideration’ taken into account by the prosecutor”.46 
Raz’s account of exclusionary reasons is one of the most 
contested parts of his theory of authority. The pre-emption thesis 
“stands on its own”, according to Raz, and need not be explained by 
treating authoritative decisions as providing exclusionary reasons: 
“possibly there are other, better explanations of it, and there is no 
need to saddle the account of authority with a commitment to that 
way of explaining the preemptiveness of authoritative directives”.47 
One alternative explanation is that the force of authoritative 
decisions is a very weighty or presumptive force, the strength of 
which varies according to the force of the underlying reasons that 
                                                     
45 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, note 33 above, p. 46. 
46 Jeffrey Jowell, “Caving In: Threats and the Rule of Law” [2008] J.R. 273, 275–
76. 
47 Joseph Raz, “On Respect, Authority, and Neutrality: A Response” (2010) 120 
Ethics 279, 298. 
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justify the authority’s claim to legitimacy.48 But that amounts to a 
fundamental challenge to the pre-emption thesis itself, for it requires 
the subjects to assess the merits of the case, to decide whether the 
presumption in favour of following the authority’s decision has been 
defeated. 
Any alternative explanation of the pre-emptiveness of 
authority ought to recognise that legitimate authority does have an 
exclusionary effect—and so subjects should not act on their 
judgment of the merits—when the normal justification condition is 
fully satisfied. But the normal justification condition may be only 
partially satisfied: on some particular issue, the agency might have 
legitimate authority in some respects but lack legitimate authority in 
others. The purported authority might have, say, greater democratic 
legitimacy or political accountability than the purported subject, but 
the purported subject might have, say, greater expertise than the 
purported authority. In this way, there may be circumstances in 
which a subject conforms better with reason in some ways by 
treating the authority’s decision as binding, but not others, and there 
may be circumstances in which there is no overriding justification 
one way or another for treating the authority’s decision as binding.49 
If that is so, the court may reasonably act on its judgment on the 
merits, notwithstanding the agency’s good claim to legitimate 
authority. 
One important implication of the pre-emption thesis is that an 
authority’s decision can be binding even when it is mistaken. It 
follows from Raz’s service conception of authority that neither a 
standard of correctness nor a standard of reasonableness can be used 
in reviewing the decision of a legitimate authority. If a legitimate 
authority’s subjects challenged its decisions “every time it fails to 
reflect reason correctly”, Raz points out, “the advantage gained by 
accepting the authority as a more reliable and successful guide to 
                                                     
48 See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, “Second-Order Reasons, Uncertainty and Legal 
Theory” (1989) 62 Southern California Law Review 913; Frederick Schauer, 
Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-
Making in Law and in Life (Oxford 1991), 88–93 
49 See James Grant, “The Scales of Authority” (2015) 60 American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 79, 85–87. Raz draws a similar, though different, conclusion—and 
for different reasons—when he writes that the cases for conformity with reason 
and for deciding oneself “may be incommensurate, with the (uncomfortable) result 
that whether one is then subject to authority is undetermined”: Raz, “The Problem 
of Authority”, note 39 above, p. 139. 
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right reason would disappear”.50 Moreover, if a legitimate authority’s 
subjects challenged its decisions every time it deviates too much 
from what is reasonable, the value of legitimate authority would be 
lost—its decisions would not have pre-emptive force—because such 
a limitation “requires every person in every case to consider the 
merits of the case before he can decide to accept the authoritative 
instruction”.51 I return to this point in section V when examining the 
implications for reasonableness review. 
Under the service conception, therefore, the subjects of a 
legitimate authority—including, for our purposes, the courts in 
judicial review of an administrative authority’s decision—are bound 
by its decision, even though they consider it to be incorrect or 
unreasonable. But that conclusion seems to go against the intuition 
that an authority’s decision should not be followed if it is clearly 
mistaken. Raz, indeed, seems to be open to the possibility that 
“legitimate authority is limited by the condition that its directives are 
not binding if clearly wrong”; however, he goes on to say that, even 
if legitimate authority were limited in this way (and he expresses no 
conclusive view on whether it is), the limit does not challenge his 
theory, because “[e]stablishing that something is clearly wrong does 
not require going through the underlying reasoning”.52 Nonetheless, 
whatever the effect of clear mistakes may be, on Raz’s theory even 
“significant mistakes which are not clear” do not affect the binding 
force of legitimate authority.53 
 
C. The Scope of Authority 
 
There is, however, one category of mistakes that necessarily affects 
the binding force of a legitimate authority’s decision: jurisdictional 
mistakes. This brings us to the crucial question: how, on Raz’s 
theory, should we distinguish questions of jurisdiction—the scope of 
legitimate authority—from questions about the merits of the case? 
As Raz explains, the distinction is crucial to the theory of authority: 
 
                                                     
50 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, note 33 above, p. 61. 
51 Ibid., p. 61. 
52 Ibid., p. 62. 
53 Ibid., p. 62. 
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The pre‐emption thesis depends on a distinction 
between jurisdictional and other mistakes. Most, if not 
all, authorities have limited powers. Mistakes which 
they make about factors which determine the limits of 
their jurisdiction render their decisions void. They are 
not binding as authoritative directives … Other 
mistakes do not affect the binding force of the 
directives. The pre‐emption thesis claims that the 
factors about which the authority was wrong, and 
which are not jurisdictional factors, are pre‐empted by 
the directive. The thesis would be pointless if most 
mistakes are jurisdictional or if in most cases it was 
particularly controversial and difficult to establish 
which are and which are not. But if this were so then 
most other accounts of authority would come to 
grief.54 
 
If, as Raz says, the pre-emption thesis depends on it being, in most 
cases, relatively easy and uncontroversial to distinguish jurisdictional 
mistakes from other mistakes, we might expect Raz’s writings to be 
clear about how to draw the distinction. However, he was not as clear 
as he could have been. 
A common misunderstanding of Raz’s thesis is that 
jurisdictional mistakes can be identified by the fact that they are 
significant and clear.55 This misunderstanding is the basis on which 
Matthew Lewans has recently argued that Raz’s definition of 
jurisdictional error “fails to account for even the most basic legal 
constraints on the exercise of administrative power”.56 The criticism 
is misplaced because Raz in fact treats clear mistakes and 
jurisdictional mistakes as distinct: as mentioned above, he does not 
take a conclusive view on whether clear mistakes limit the binding 
force of a legitimate authority’s directives, but he explicitly states 
that jurisdictional mistakes necessarily affect the binding force of the 
directive.57 
                                                     
54 Ibid., p. 62. 
55 See, e.g., Margaret Martin, Judging Positivism (Oxford 2014), 83; Lewans, 
Administrative Law and Judicial Deference, note 1 above, p. 212. 
56 Lewans, Administrative Law and Judicial Deference, note 1 above, p. 212. 
57 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, note 33 above, p. 62. 
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How, then, are jurisdictional mistakes distinguished in Raz’s 
theory? Correctly understood, the test for jurisdiction simply restates 
the conditions for the justification of legitimate authority. The 
normal justification condition is also the normal test for jurisdiction. 
That means that determining jurisdiction involves determining the 
extent to which the normal justification condition is satisfied—with 
the important clarification, as discussed above, that the normal 
justification condition may be satisfied not only in cases where the 
authority is more likely to reach the right answer, but also for 
procedural reasons (because, for example, the law has allocated the 
power to the authority, or the authority is subject to greater political 
accountability, or its procedures are more likely to treat the subject 
with respect). The question of which matters are within an 
authority’s jurisdiction is a question of which matters are better 
settled by the authority, because following its decision would enable 
us to conform better with reason. Excluded reasons are the merits of 
the case, and the scope of the excluded reasons is the scope of an 
authority’s jurisdiction. Whether the normal justification condition is 
satisfied may at times be unclear and controversial, but it is crucial 
for determining the scope of an authority’s jurisdiction and therefore 
whether the authority’s decision pre-empts the subject’s judgment on 
the merits of the case.  
Some critics of Raz’s theory have seen a contradiction in this 
aspect of his theory. This is because it seems to undermine Raz’s 
argument that an authority’s subjects “can benefit by its decisions 
only if they can establish their existence and content in ways which 
do not depend on raising the very same issues which the authority is 
there to settle”.58 The pre-emption thesis is undermined if subjects 
must assess the dependent reasons that are better settled by the 
authority. But, according to critics, assessing whether an authority 
has acted within its jurisdiction on Raz’s account requires the 
authority’s subjects to assess the dependent reasons (or relevant 
considerations) in order to check which dependent reasons are better 
settled by the authority. According to Heidi Hurd, for instance, Raz’s 
theory entails that one can only determine whether an authority has 
acted within its jurisdiction “if, at each decision, one judges for 
oneself the antecedently existing reasons for action, and then 
determines whether the commands of the authority in fact reflect that 
                                                     
58 Raz, “Authority, Law and Morality”, note 33 above, p. 219. 
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balance”.59 Thus, Hurd argues, the jurisdictional condition on 
legitimate authority is one reason why an authority’s decisions 
cannot have the pre-emptive force that Raz claims. 
This criticism of Raz’s theory overlooks the distinction 
between two assessments. The first is an assessment of which 
matters are within the authority’s jurisdiction. This is the normal 
justification condition: over which matters are we more likely to 
conform with reason by following the authority’s decision? The 
second assessment is the balancing of the dependent reasons relating 
to those matters that are within the authority’s jurisdiction. The first 
assessment (determining jurisdiction) does not involve the second 
assessment (deciding the merits of the case). In relation to Corner 
House, we can reach the conclusion that the Director and the court 
would be more likely to conform with reason by following the 
Government’s assessment of the risk to public safety than by 
assessing for themselves what the risk to public is (and hence that 
this assessment is within the Government’s jurisdiction) without 
themselves having to assess the risk to public safety. 
Furthermore, the scope of legitimate authority need not be 
limited to balancing the reasons on the matters that are within the 
authority’s jurisdiction. Jurisdiction may extend to settling what 
some of the dependent reasons are in the first place. It cannot settle 
what all the dependent reasons are, because acting for dependent 
reasons is a condition of legitimate authority, and so the authority’s 
subjects—not the authority itself—must decide whether that 
condition is satisfied. The subjects must determine what some of the 
dependent reasons are, even if they should leave the balance of those 
reasons to the legitimate authority. But the authority may be better 
placed to determine what some of the other dependent reasons are, 
and on Raz’s account it need not take into account all the 
considerations that its subjects think are relevant.60 If so, then 
                                                     
59 Heidi Hurd, “Challenging Authority” (1991) 100 Yale L.J. 1611, 1634. A similar 
point is made in Dimitrios Kyritsis, “The Persistent Significance of Jurisdiction” 
(2012) 25 Ratio Juris 343, 348. 
60 Raz suggests that the pre-emption thesis does not debar people from criticising 
the authority “for having ignored certain reasons or for having been mistaken about 
their significance”; the pre-emption thesis merely entails that “action for some of 
these reasons … is excluded”: Raz, The Morality of Freedom, note 33 above, p. 42. 
Cf. CREEDNZ Inc. v Governor General [1981] 1 N.Z.L.R. 172, 183, per Cooke J., 
suggesting that the courts should defer to a decision maker’s reasonable judgment 
as to the relevance of a consideration. 
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subjects should defer not only to the authority’s judgment of the 
balance of dependent reasons, but should also treat as pre-emptive 
some of the authority’s judgments of what the dependent reasons 
are.61 For example, in assessing the risk to public safety, the 
Government may be better placed (and so have jurisdiction) not only 
to determine the weight and balance of the relevant considerations, 
but also to determine which considerations are relevant to that 
assessment. 
 
D. Deference among Authorities 
 
The theory of authority set out in this section requires judges to defer 
to an administrative decision maker’s judgment on the merits of the 
case when the decision maker has a greater claim to legitimate 
authority than the court. This notion of judicial deference is 
controversial. The decision of the House of Lords in Corner House, 
for example, has been criticised as a “lapse into the unnecessarily 
deferential administrative law of yesteryear”.62 There is resistance to 
the very word “deference”, with its apparent “overtones of 
servility”.63 For sure, as Lord Steyn says in discussing deference, 
“labels are less important than the underlying approach or 
philosophy and its consequences”.64 But the approach that underlies 
the attitude of some, though not all, judges and public lawyers 
towards deference is very different from the Razian approach 
defended in this article. Their approach to deference tends to treat it 
as an attitude of “respect” towards the authority’s decision, but 
without recognising a duty to follow the authority.65 
                                                     
61 See Timothy Endicott, Administrative Law, 3rd edn (Oxford 2015), 280–85; 
Hanna Wilberg, “Deference on Relevance and Purpose? Wrestling with the 
Law/Discretion Divide” in Wilberg and Elliott (eds), The Scope and Intensity of 
Substantive Review, note 7 above. 
62 Jowell, “Caving In”, note 46 above, p. 276. 
63 R. (ProLife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation [2003] UKHL 23, 
[2004] 1 A.C. 185, 240, per Lord Hoffmann. 
64 Lord Steyn, “Deference: A Tangled Story” [2005] P.L. 346, 350. 
65 See, e.g. David Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and 
Democracy” in Michael Taggart (ed.), The Province of Administrative Law 
(Oxford 1997); Murray Hunt, “Sovereignty’s Blight” in Nicholas Bamforth and 
Peter Leyland (eds), Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Oxford 2003). 
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Even among those who accept that a court may be under a 
duty to follow an administrative agency, there is some resistance to 
describing the court as being subject to, and “obeying”, the authority 
of the agency. Timothy Endicott, for example, prefers the language 
of “comity”, which he describes as “the respect by the second 
authority for the first authority, where the second authority is not 
bound by the decisions of the first”.66 On this view, the court in 
judicial review proceedings should adopt an attitude of respect, as 
opposed to obedience, to decisions that are within the jurisdiction of 
a legitimate administrative authority. 
But the idea of a duty of respect, courtesy, or comity, in 
contrast with a duty to obey, is insufficient to cover all relations 
among authorities. When an administrative decision maker, and not 
the court, has legitimate authority to decide a matter, judges manifest 
their respect for authority by recognising the binding force of its 
decision. Indeed, it seems that Endicott in effect accepts this point, 
when he acknowledges that the reasons for reviewing court to respect 
the administrative official’s decision are the same as the reasons that 
justify legitimate authority (according to the normal justification 
thesis) and are limited to matters that are within the first authority’s 
jurisdiction.67 The situation may be different if both authorities have 
equally good claims to possess legitimate authority over the same 
matter. Some of the examples of relations among authorities that 
Endicott discusses seem to be of this kind, such as the relation 
between two parents with authority over a child.68 But where the 
matter falls within the jurisdiction of an administrative decision 
maker and not the court, the former has legitimate authority over the 
latter, and for that reason its decision is binding on the court and pre-
empts the court’s judgment of the merits. 
 
IV. QUESTIONS OF LAW 
 
A. Substitution of Judgment on Questions of Law 
 
Legal doctrine ought to reflect this theory of legitimate authority. But 
comparative study reveals that, in most if not all legal systems, it 
rarely does. One example of this failure can be found in the doctrinal 
                                                     
66 Timothy Endicott, “Comity among Authorities” (2015) 68 C.L.P. 1, 4. 
67 Ibid., pp. 9–11, 22–24. 
68 Ibid., p. 5. 
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approaches to judicial review for error of law. As mentioned above, 
statutory allocations of power are one reason for holding that an 
administrative agency has legitimate authority. Consequently, 
determining an agency’s jurisdiction may involve a determination of 
whether its decision is within the limits of the power allocated by the 
statute. But there is often room for doubt and disagreement about the 
meaning of a statutory provision. In many legal systems, the courts 
substitute their judgment on questions of law—that is, they treat 
questions of statutory interpretation as being for the courts to resolve, 
on the assumption that, if they deferred to the agency’s interpretation 
of the statute, that deference would enable the agency to determine 
its own jurisdiction. My aim in this section is to explain why this 
approach is fundamentally flawed. 
The “substitution of judgment” approach to questions of law 
is adopted in, for instance, English (and, more recently, UK),69 New 
Zealand, Australian, and EU administrative law.70 It was not always 
so. English law used to distinguish between jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional errors of law, with only the former giving rise to the 
court’s intervention. But the English courts drew this distinction in 
confusing ways—such as by distinguishing between precedent 
conditions and other conditions, or between being entitled to enter 
into an inquiry and going wrong in the course of that inquiry—and as 
a result it was difficult to predict which errors of law the courts 
would deem to be jurisdictional.71 The point of departure from this 
                                                     
69 For a defence of the term “UK administrative law”, see Paul Craig, UK, EU and 
Global Administrative Law: Foundations and Challenges (Cambridge 2015), 10. 
Scots law eventually followed the English position on error of law in Eba v 
Advocate General for Scotland [2011] UKSC 29, [2012] 1 A.C. 710, at [34], per 
Lord Hope of Craighead. For the position in Northern Ireland, see Gordon 
Anthony, Judicial Review in Northern Ireland, 2nd edn (Oxford 2014), ch. 5.  
70 See Paul Craig, “Judicial Review of Questions of Law: A Comparative 
Perspective” in Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter L Lindseth (eds), Comparative 
Administrative Law (Cheltenham 2010); Peter Cane, Controlling Administrative 
Power: An Historical Comparison (Cambridge 2016), 215–37. 
71 See Amnon Rubinstein, Jurisdiction and Illegality (Oxford 1965); Craig, 
Administrative Law, note 1 above, pp. 477–78. For defences of the old approach, 
exemplified by R. v Bolton (1841) 1 Q.B. 66, see D.M. Gordon, “The Relation of 
Facts to Jurisdiction” (1929) 45 L.Q.R. 459, and his articles at (1931) 47 L.Q.R. 
386, (1939) 55 L.Q.R. 521, (1951) 67 L.Q.R. 452, (1966) 82 L.Q.R. 515, and 
(1971) 34 M.L.R. 1. See also Philip Murray, “Escaping the Wilderness: R. v Bolton 
and Judicial Review for Error of Law” [2016] C.L.J. 333. 
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older approach is often traced to Anisminic v Foreign Compensation 
Commission.72 In a later case, Lord Diplock said of Anisminic that it:  
 
proceeds on the presumption that … Parliament 
intends to confine [a public authority’s] power to 
answering the question as it has been so defined [by 
the enabling Act]: and if there has been any doubt as 
to what that question is, this is a matter for courts of 
law to resolve in fulfilment of their constitutional role 
as interpreters of the written law and expounders of 
the common law and rules of equity.73 
 
Following this interpretation, or misreading,74 of Anisminic, Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson concluded in R. v Hull University Visitor, ex 
parte Page that “in general any error of law made by an 
administrative tribunal or inferior court in reaching its decision can 
be quashed for error of law”.75 The alleged virtues of this general 
rule are its apparent simplicity and consistency with principles such 
as (a Diceyan interpretation of) the rule of law and the separation of 
powers.76 However, the general rule is subject to a few “anomalous” 
exceptions.77 The recognition of these exceptions can make judicial 
                                                     
72 Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147, H.L. See 
David Feldman, “Anisminic in Perspective” in Satvinder Juss and Maurice Sunkin 
(eds), Landmark Cases in Public Law (Oxford 2017). 
73 In Re Racal Communications Ltd [1981] A.C. 374, H.L., 382–83, per Lord 
Diplock. 
74 The majority in Anisminic did not abandon the distinction between jurisdictional 
and non-jurisdictional errors of law: see Anisminic [1969] 2 A.C. 147, 174, per 
Lord Reid, 195, per Lord Pearce, 209, per Lord Wilberforce. See further Endicott, 
Administrative Law, note 61 above, pp. 321–23. 
75 R. v Hull University Visitor, ex parte Page [1993] A.C. 682, H.L., 702, per Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson.  
76 Ivan Hare, “The Separation of Powers and Judicial Review for Error of Law” in 
Christopher Forsyth and Ivan Hare (eds), The Golden Metwand and the Crooked 
Cord: Essays on Public Law in Honour of Sir William Wade (Oxford 1998). 
77 For examples of exceptions to the general rule, see Page [1993] A.C. 682, 702–
3, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson (a special type of law of which the university 
visitor was the final arbiter); Racal [1981] A.C. 374, 383, per Lord Diplock; Page 
[1993] A.C. 682, 703, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson (an inferior court made “final 
and conclusive” by statute); R. (Cart) v The Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28, 
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review for error of law seem “hopelessly confused”, not only to those 
who think that the courts should substitute judgment on all questions 
of law,78 but also to those who think that the autonomy that these 
exceptions give to some administrative agencies to decide some 
questions of law should be extended to others.79 
Substitution of judgment on all questions of law leads to 
overly intrusive judicial review.80 The old doctrinal ways of 
distinguishing between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors of 
law may have been confused and confusing, but, as Paul Craig 
rightly warns, “we are, nonetheless, in danger of forgetting the 
rationale for them”.81 As Craig explains, “[t]he critical question, the 
answer to which underlies any statement concerning jurisdictional 
limits, is whose relative opinion on which matters should be held to 
be authoritative”.82 The claim that all questions of law are for the 
courts is based on either a dubious jurisprudential theory that 
considers it to be axiomatic that the judicial should be final arbiters 
on all questions of law, or the belief that the judiciary have a special 
expertise over matters of legal interpretation.83 If it is right that all 
questions of law should be for the courts, the retention of a degree of 
autonomy for the agency depends on distinguishing between 
questions of law, questions of fact, and questions of the application 
of law to facts.84 One way to rationalise the approach of the English 
courts is to say that they will treat all questions of interpretation as 
questions of law—and thus will substitute their judgment—but will 
treat questions of application as questions of law only when (in the 
                                                     
[2012] 1 A.C. 663, at [57], per Baroness Hale of Richmond (Upper Tribunal 
decisions, reviewed only when it would be “rational and proportionate” to do so). 
78 Hare, “The Separation of Powers and Judicial Review for Error of Law”, note 76 
above, p. 120. 
79 See Allan, “Doctrine and Theory in Administrative Law”, note 1 above, pp. 
443–45; Endicott, Administrative Law, note 61 above, pp. 330–31. 
80 See, e.g., Jack Beatson, “The Scope of Judicial Review for Error of Law” (1984) 
4 O.J.L.S. 22. 
81 Craig, Administrative Law, note 1 above, p. 500. 
82 Ibid., p. 487. See also Taggart, “The Contribution of Lord Cooke”, note 1 above. 
83 See, e.g., Hare, “The Separation of Powers and Judicial Review for Error of 
Law”, note 76 above, p. 131; Philip Hamburg, Is Administrative Law Unlawful 
(Chicago 2014). 
84 Beatson, “The Scope of Judicial Review for Error of Law”, note 80 above, pp. 
41–42. See further Endicott, Administrative Law, note 61 above, ch. 9. 
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court’s view) the law clearly requires one answer.85 But that 
approach overlooks the good reasons that the courts have to defer, 
including on questions of law, to the judgment of an administrative 
agency acting within the scope of its legitimate authority. 
 
B. Deference on Questions of Law 
 
Consider the generic form of a statutory allocation of power: “If X1, 
X2, and X3, then the agency may or shall do Y”. The question of 
statutory interpretation then arises whether the statute should be read 
as meaning, “If X1, X2, X3, and X4, then the agency may or shall do 
Y”—where X4 can be understood either as a further condition, 
alleged to be implicit in the statute, or as a more specific meaning 
attributed to one of the explicit (but under-specified) conditions. 
Here it is important to distinguish between three questions: 
 
(1) Should the interpreter attribute to the statute a meaning that 
includes X4 as a condition of the power? 
(2) Should X4 be a condition of the power? 
(3) Should the court or the agency decide question (2)? 
 
The statute, let us assume, says nothing about X4: it neither states 
that X4 is required nor that X4 is not required. To work out whether 
the agency should satisfy X4, we must answer question (2). This 
question could be regarded either as determining the meaning of the 
statutory limits or as determining the limits that should be imposed in 
addition to any statutory limits. For example, in Cooper v 
Wandsworth Board of Works, the statute said nothing about the 
requirement of a fair hearing, but the court imposed that requirement 
before the Board of Works could exercise its statutory power.86 
Some commentators believe that this condition can only be justified 
                                                     
85 The classic example of this approach is Lord Radcliffe’s speech in Edwards v 
Bairstow [1956] A.C. 14, 33–36. For a good illustration, see R. v Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission, ex parte South Yorkshire Transport Ltd [1993] 1 W.L.R. 23, 
30–32, H.L., per Lord Mustill. See further Timothy A.O. Endicott, “Questions of 
Law” (1998) 114 L.Q.R. 292, 306, 316–21; Williams, “When is an Error not an 
Error?”, note 1 above, pp. 803–8. 
86 Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 C.B.N.S. 180, 194, per Byles 
J.: “Although there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall 
be heard, yet the justice of the common law shall supply the omission of the 
legislature.” 
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as an interpretation of the statute. They believe that, because 
Parliament is sovereign, a statutory allocation of power must contain 
all the limits on that power, otherwise the imposition of limits would 
be contrary to parliamentary sovereignty.87 This proposition has 
been, in my view, persuasively shown to be false.88 The statutory 
allocation may be indeterminate. But we can intelligibly speak both 
ways: framing the condition either as the meaning of the statute or as 
a further, common law condition in addition to the statutory 
conditions.89 In either case, the answer to question (2) is not justified 
by any fact about the statute (such as “legislative intent”), though it 
is consistent with the statute. 
But there is then question (3), which is the question of 
deference on questions of law: Should the court or the agency decide 
whether X4 should be a condition of the power? The answer to 
question (3) depends on which institution satisfies the normal 
justification thesis and therefore has a good claim to legitimate 
authority. Three answers are possible. The first is that the court is 
better placed than the agency to decide question (2)—because, let us 
say, of its greater expertise, its ability to achieve consistency among 
uncoordinated decision makers, or its independence.90 If so, the court 
has legitimate authority to impose that condition on the agency, 
which is consistent with, but not justified by, the statute. The second 
possible answer is that the agency has legitimate authority over the 
court to decide question (2)—because, let us say, of its greater 
expertise, its ability to achieve coordination, or its political 
                                                     
87 See, e.g., Christopher Forsyth, “Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires 
Doctrine, the Sovereignty of Parliament and Judicial Review” (1996) 55 C.L.J. 
122, 133: “what an all powerful Parliament does not prohibit, it must authorise 
either expressly or impliedly. … There is no grey area between authorisation and 
prohibition or between empowerment and the denial of power.” See also Mark 
Elliott, The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review (Oxford 2001), ch. 4. 
88 See e.g., John Laws, “Illegality: The Problem of Jurisdiction” in Michael 
Supperstone and James Goudie (eds), Judicial Review (London 1997), paras 4.17–
4.18; Andrew Halpin, “The Theoretical Controversy Concerning Judicial Review” 
(2001) 64 M.L.R. 500; Timothy Endicott, “Constitutional Logic” (2003) 53 
U.T.L.J. 201, 204–5, 213–16; Paul Craig, UK, EU and Global Administrative Law, 
note 69 above, pp. 138–40. 
89 See further Timothy Endicott, “Legal Interpretation” in Andrei Marmor (ed.), 
The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law (London 2012), 119–20. 
90 For a good and succinct summary of these factors, see Endicott, Administrative 
Law, note 61 above, pp. 328–29. 
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accountability. To the extent that question (2) is an aspect of 
statutory interpretation, the agency would therefore have jurisdiction 
to interpret the statutory conditions of its power. In doing so, the 
agency would not be determining the limits of its own jurisdiction, 
but would be acting within its jurisdiction (in the sense of legitimate 
authority). To suppose otherwise is to misunderstand the difference 
between questions (1) and (3)—that is, between statutory 
authorisation (a question of law) and legitimate authority (a question 
of jurisdiction). 
Take, for example, the Pergau Dam case,91 which concerned 
the decision of the then Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, to grant 
£316 million in aid to Malaysia for the Pergau Dam project, 
allegedly in exchange for an arms deal, against the advice of the 
government’s own economic advisers that the project was 
economically unsound. Section 1(1) of the Overseas Development 
and Co-operation Act 1980 empowered the Secretary of State to 
grant aid “for the purpose of promoting the development or 
maintaining the economy of a country or territory outside the United 
Kingdom”. The question, unanswered by the text of the statute, was 
whether this statutory power should be used only for economically 
sound projects. Rose L.J. held: 
 
Whatever the Secretary of State’s intention or purpose 
may have been, it is, as it seems to me, a matter for 
the courts and not for the Secretary of State to 
determine whether, on the evidence before the court, 
the particular conduct was, or was not, within the 
statutory purpose.92 
 
The court assumed that it had legitimate authority to determine the 
statute’s purpose and which considerations the statute required to be 
taken into account or ruled out. The court ruled that economic 
soundness was of paramount importance, rather than merely one 
relevant consideration among others. But did not the Foreign 
Secretary have a good claim to legitimate authority to decide whether 
this should be treated as a condition of the power? This decision 
involved highly political considerations of foreign relations, usually 
                                                     
91 R. v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte World 
Development Movement Ltd [1995] 1 W.L.R. 386, D.C. 
92 World Development Movement Ltd [1995] 1 W.L.R. 386, 401, per Rose L.J. 
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treated as falling within the legitimate authority of the executive, 
which is accountable to Parliament.93 The decision did not become 
any less political by being masked behind the façade of statutory 
interpretation. 
There is a third possible answer to question (3): neither the 
court nor the agency may be better placed to decide question (2). In 
that case, there is a difference between, on the one hand, interpreting 
a condition that the statutory text imposes and, on the other, 
interpreting a seemingly unfettered power in a way that reads in a 
condition. While the line between these two types of case may be 
vague, there are clear cases of each. The closer we get to the former, 
the greater the justification for the court substituting its 
interpretation. The closer we get to the latter, the greater the 
justification for the agency deciding the question. 
In the former type of case, the court should intervene if the 
decision is unreasonable or incorrect, but arguably not if there is a 
range of reasonable decisions, none of which is uniquely correct. 
That is not about deference to legitimate authority. Yet the belief that 
judicial deference on questions of law should be manifested by the 
court’s adoption of a standard of reasonableness, rather than 
correctness, in assessing an agency’s interpretation is found, in 
different ways, in the United States and Canada. The US courts, 
under the doctrine of “Chevron deference”,94 treat statutory 
ambiguity as an implicit delegation of interpretive authority to the 
agency, and will defer to the agency’s interpretation if it is 
reasonable: the agency is said to be “the authoritative interpreter 
(within the limits of reason) of such statutes”.95 The Canadian courts 
also defer to reasonable administrative interpretations of the law, if 
such deference is required by a “pragmatic and functional analysis” 
                                                     
93 See, e.g., Lord Irvine of Lairg, “Judges and Decision Makers: The Theory and 
Practice of Wednesbury Review” [1996] P.L. 59, 69; Jonathan Sumption, “Judicial 
and Political Decision-Making: The Uncertain Boundary” [2011] J.R. 301, 305–6. 
94 Chevron USA Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council 467 US 837, 842–43 
(1984). 
95 National Cable & Telecommunications Association v Brand X Internet Services 
125 S. Ct 2688, 2712 (2005), per Breyer J. Statutory ambiguity is not the only 
justification for deference given by the US courts, which also discuss other 
reasons, including expertise and political accountability: see Chevron 467 US 837, 
844, 865; United States v Mead Corporation 533 US 218, 227–31 (2001); 
Barnhart v Walton 535 US 212, 222 (2002). 
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(now referred to as the “standard of review analysis”).96 In that 
analysis, the court considers a range of factors, including the 
expertise of the agency, along the lines of the test for jurisdiction 
defended in this article.97 One problem with both the US and 
Canadian approaches is that the notion of deference to legitimate 
authority cannot justify a standard of reasonableness for judicial 
review. That standard can be justified only when neither the court 
nor the agency has legitimate authority to interpret the provision, in 
which case the court should go along with the agency’s 
interpretation, for reasons of comity, unless it is unreasonable.98 
When the agency has legitimate authority to interpret the provision, 
there is no justification for the court to intervene merely because it 
thinks the agency’s interpretation is unreasonable—unless, perhaps, 
it is clear that the agency made a mistake.99  
When the question is whether the court should impose a 
condition on a seemingly unfettered discretionary power—such as 
the power conferred on the Director in Corner House—that statutory 
allocation of power is itself one reason for recognising that the 
agency has legitimate authority. That does not mean that the court is 
never justified in imposing a condition on the power. The House of 
Lords was wrong to suggest, in ex parte Brind, that no ambiguity 
arises where a statute confers a broad discretion without explicit 
limits and that the court should therefore not read in conditions.100 
                                                     
96 See the reassessment of the law in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick 2008 SCC 9, 
[2008] 1 S.C.R. 190. 
97 For the list of factors, see Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration) [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982. Confusingly, the Supreme Court of Canada 
later held that the pragmatic and functional was not necessary when determining 
“true questions of jurisdiction or vires”: Dunsmuir [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at [59], per 
Bastarache J. and LeBel J. For criticism and doubts about this category, see Craig, 
“Judicial Review of Questions of Law, note 70 above, p. 460; Alberta (Information 
and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 S.C.C. 61, 
[2011] 3 S.C.R. 654, at [42], per Rothstein J.  
98 Cf. Endicott, “Comity among Authorities”, note 66 above. 
99 The Supreme Court of Canada used to draw a distinction between 
unreasonableness and “patent unreasonableness”, which roughly captured this 
point: see Canadian Union of Public Employees Local 963 v New Brunswick 
Liquor Co. [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227, per Dickson J. 
100 R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1991] 1 A.C. 
696, H.L., 748, per Lord Bridge of Harwich, 761, per Lord Ackner. Cf. R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 
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Discretionary powers without explicit limits are not unambiguous 
and conclusive; rather, they are defeasible.101 The court does not 
necessarily act contrary to the statute by imposing a condition on 
such powers, whether or not that condition is justified as an 
interpretation of the statute.102 But the court can justifiably impose a 
condition on that power only if the court is better placed to make that 
decision, and therefore has a better claim to legitimate authority, 
notwithstanding the statutory allocation. Likewise, there may be 
circumstances in which the court is justified in departing from a clear 
statutory condition, if the statutory allocation of power—and the 
conditions attached to that allocation—do not match the scope of the 
agency’s legitimate authority.103 
 
V. REASONABLENESS REVIEW 
 
Many judges and commentators treat the standard of reasonableness 
as determining the boundaries of the decision maker’s jurisdiction.104 
This approach was evident in the Wednesbury case itself, in which 
the high threshold of unreasonableness that Lord Greene tried to 
formulate—according to which the court will intervene only when 
the decision is “so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could 
ever have come to it”—was combined with the statement that, 
provided the local authority acts “within the four corners of their 
                                                     
130, per Lord Steyn, holding that “the principle of legality” is a presumption of 
statutory interpretation “even in the absence of an ambiguity”. 
101 Endicott, “Constitutional Logic”, note 88 above, pp. 214–15. 
102 See Bromley London Borough Council v Greater London Council [1983] 1 A.C. 
768, H.L., 821, per Lord Diplock: “Powers … although unqualified by any express 
words in the Act, may nonetheless be subject to implied limitations… [T]he 
question of discretion is, in my view, inseparable from the question of 
construction.” 
103 See, e.g., David Feldman, “Error of Law and Flawed Administrative Acts” 
[2014] C.L.J. 275, 288–89, 312–13, citing Robinson v Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 32, [2002] N.I. 390; Wang v Commissioners of 
Inland Revenue [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1286, P.C., 1296, per Lord Slynn of Hedley. 
104 See, e.g., T.R.S. Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution, and 
Common Law (Oxford 2013), 112: “A public official acts ultra vires—in excess of 
jurisdiction—if he … acts unreasonably”; Mark Elliott, “The Ultra Vires Doctrine 
in a Constitutional Setting: Still the Central Principle of Administrative Law” 
(2000) 58 C.L.J. 129, 135: “logic dictates that any requirements of fairness and 
rationality which obtain must be internal to the grant [of executive power] itself.” 
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jurisdiction, this court, in my opinion, cannot interfere”.105 On Lord 
Greene’s view, the court could justifiably interfere with a decision 
that, although “prima facie within the powers of the executive 
authority”, was “so unreasonable” that it was actually “in excess of 
the powers which Parliament has confided in them.”106 This section 
explains more fully why the ground of unreasonableness cannot be a 
basis for determining the scope of legitimate authority and cannot 
justify judicial intervention. 
 
A. Two Types of Restraint 
 
The confusion surrounding the role of reasonableness review is 
partly explained by a failure to distinguish between two types of 
judicial restraint. One is the type of restraint that is the focus of this 
article, which arises when the court defers to a legitimate authority 
on decisions that are within that authority’s jurisdiction. The other 
type of restraint arises where, in the court’s view, there is no right 
answer, but rather a range of reasonable decisions, perhaps due to 
reasonable disagreement or uncertainty over what the right answer is, 
or incommensurability among the options. “The very concept of 
administrative discretion,” according to Lord Diplock, “involves a 
right to choose between more than one possible course of action 
upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing 
opinions as to which is to be preferred.”107 In exercising this second 
type of restraint, the court only intervenes when the agency acts for a 
defeated reason, which takes its decision outside the range of 
reasonable decisions.108 
The high threshold of “Wednesbury unreasonableness”, in 
Lord Greene’s somewhat tautological formulation, has sometimes 
been criticised for being overly deferential to the administrative 
decision maker. For it suggests that there is a distinction between a 
decision that is merely unreasonable and one that is “so unreasonable 
that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it”. The 
problem is that Lord Greene justified judicial restraint primarily on 
                                                     
105 Wednesbury [1948] 1 K.B. 223, 231 and 234, per Lord Greene M.R. 
106 Wednesbury [1948] 1 K.B. 223, 231 and 234, per Lord Greene M.R. 
107 Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough 
Council [1977] A.C. 1014, H.L., 1064, per Lord Diplock. 
108 Gardner, “The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person”, note 8 above, pp. 566–
67. 
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the basis of the second type of restraint (a range of reasonable 
decisions), stating that the court should not intervene in decisions 
about which “honest and sincere people hold different views”.109 But 
that does not explain why judicial restraint is justified when the 
decision under review is unreasonable, in the sense that it is outside 
the range of reasonable decisions. For this reason, Lord Cooke of 
Thorndon criticised Wednesbury’s suggestion that “there are 
different degrees of unreasonableness and that only a very extreme 
degree can bring an administrative decision within the scope of 
judicial invalidation”.110 Lord Cooke thought that the administrator’s 
duty “is simply to act reasonably”,111 and that the court should ask 
whether the decision maker had “struck a balance fairly and 
reasonably open to him”.112 
However, Lord Greene’s mistake was not his excessive 
deference, but his failure to explain adequately why, and in what 
way, deference is appropriate. It is the notion of legitimate authority, 
rather than the notion of a range of reasonable decisions, that justifies 
judicial restraint in the face of a decision that the judge considers to 
be unreasonable. Conversely, it is the decision maker’s lack of 
legitimate authority that justifies the court’s intervention. It might be 
thought that the notion of reasonableness can incorporate the notion 
of deference to a legitimate authority, the court intervening only if 
the decision is so unreasonable that its unreasonableness defeats the 
reasons for deferring to the legitimate authority.113 But that is 
confusing, because it is not the degree of unreasonableness that 
justifies judicial intervention. Rather, judicial intervention is justified 
because there is some consideration—what Raz calls a “non-
                                                     
109 Wednesbury [1948] 1 K.B. 223, 230, per Lord Greene M.R. 
110 R. (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26, 
[2001] 2 A.C. 532, at [32], per Lord Cooke of Thorndon. 
111 Lord Cooke of Thorndon, “The Discretionary Heart of Administrative Law” in 
Forsyth and Hare (eds), The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord, note 76 
above, p. 128. 
112 R. v Chief Constable of Sussex, ex parte International Trader’s Ferry Ltd 
[1999] 2 A.C. 418, 452–53, per Lord Cooke of Thorndon. 
113 This approach to reasonableness is not unique to judicial review: for example, 
in using the concept of reasonableness in negligence claims, the courts also show 
deference to experts. See Hickman, “The Reasonableness Principle: Reassessing its 
Place in the Public Sphere” [2004] C.L.J. 166, 178–181; Lord Woolf, “Are the 
Courts Excessively Deferential to the Medical Profession?” (2001) 9 Med. L.R. 1, 
1–2. 
This is an Accepted Manuscript, which may not include final edits. 
The final version will be published in (2017) 76 Cambridge Law 
Journal 
 
35 
excluded” reason—that makes the matter better settled by the courts. 
That is, there must be some reason that defeats the legitimacy of the 
authority, and hence defeats the pre-emptive reason that the court had 
to refrain from acting on its own judgment of the merits. 
Similarly, it is confusing to describe the standard of 
reasonableness as a variable standard or as giving rise to a variable 
intensity of review depending on the context.114 To the extent that 
variable intensity of review is justified, it is because the legitimate 
authority of the decision maker varies depending on the context. 
Variable intensity of review is not the result of different standards of 
review being applied. It is commonly thought that classic 
Wednesbury unreasonableness is a low-intensity standard of review, 
whereas proportionality (or “modified” Wednesbury 
unreasonableness) is a high-intensity standard of review. But that is 
not the relevant distinction. The notion of reasonableness is flexible 
enough to contain within it the proportionality standard, involving 
some balancing of the merits,115 and there will often be a range of 
proportionate answers, just as there is a range of reasonable 
answers.116 For this reason, it is a mistake to think that 
proportionality review is any more of a “wrongful usurpation of 
power” than reasonableness review, as Lord Ackner claimed.117 Nor 
is it correct to claim that proportionality, unlike the reasonableness 
standard, shifts the burden of justification to the administrative 
                                                     
114 Sir John Laws, “Wednesbury” in Forsyth and Hare (eds), The Golden Metwand 
and the Crooked Cord, note 76 above, p. 190: “The rule of reason requires a 
variable standard of review.” 
115 Ibid., pp. 196–97; Paul Craig, “The Nature of Reasonableness Review” (2013) 
66 C.L.P. 131; Craig, UK, EU and Global Administrative Law, note 69 above, p. 
258. Cf. Sir Philip Sales, “Rationality, Proportionality and the Development of the 
Law” (2013) 129 L.Q.R. 223, 236. 
116 See Julian Rivers, “Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review” (2006) 65 
C.L.J. 174, 201; Irvine, “Judges and Decision Makers”, note 93 above, p. 65. Cf. 
Daly [2001] UKHL 26, [2001] 2 A.C. 532, at [27], per Lord Steyn: “the doctrine of 
proportionality may require the reviewing court to assess the balance which the 
decision-maker has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of rational or 
reasonable decisions”. This explanation of the difference was also expressed in 
Smith and Grady v UK (1999) 29 EHRR 493. 
117 R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1991] 1 A.C. 
696, 762–63, per Lord Ackner. 
This is an Accepted Manuscript, which may not include final edits. 
The final version will be published in (2017) 76 Cambridge Law 
Journal 
 
36 
agency.118 When the burden of justification shifts, it is because there 
is some special reason—perhaps a prima facie interference with a 
fundamental right or perhaps (as the Divisional Court thought in 
Corner House) a threat to the rule of law—that makes the decision 
better suited for the courts, thereby defeating the pre-emptive reason 
not to act on one’s own judgment of the merits, and triggering the 
need for greater justification from the administrative agency.119 On 
the other hand, the greater the justification of agency’s legitimate 
authority on an issue, the less likely will be a non-excluded reason 
justifying the court’s intervention.120 
 
C. Reasonableness and the Critique of Deference 
 
We have already encountered criticisms of the notion of judicial 
deference. Lord Bingham, for example, preferred to describe the 
restraint that judges should show to an administrative agency as 
“according appropriate weight” to its judgment.121 That demonstrates 
a flawed understanding of the pre-emptive force of the reasons for 
following the legitimate authority’s decision. The legitimate 
authority’s decision does not give us a reason that is added to all the 
other first-order reasons in the balance, or that affects the weight of 
the first-order reasons. When the administrative agency has 
legitimate authority, the courts should not act on their judgment of 
the balance of first-order reasons, unless there is a reason that defeats 
the agency’s legitimate authority and makes the court better placed to 
settle the matter. 
An even more fundamental critique of deference comes from 
T.R.S. Allan, who objects to the existence of a doctrine of ‘due 
                                                     
118 For this claim, see Michael Taggart, “Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury” 
[2008] New Zealand Law Review 423, 439–40, 465. 
119 This is the best justification for the use of “anxious scrutiny” in English law in 
cases involving fundamental rights: see, e.g., Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [1987] A.C. 514; R. v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith 
[1996] Q.B. 517, 554, per Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. Compare Mark Elliott, 
“From Bifurcation to Calibration: Twin-Track Deference and the Culture of 
Justification” in Wilberg and Elliott (eds), The Scope and Intensity of Substantive 
Review, note 7 above.  
120 See, e.g., R. v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Nottinghamshire 
County Council [1986] A.C. 240. 
121 Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11, [2007] 
2 A.C. 167, at [16], per Lord Bingham of Cornhill. 
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deference’ that stands apart from the assessment of the 
reasonableness of the agency’s decision. From the judges’ 
perspective, Allan argues, there is no “division between first-order 
considerations of substance or content and second-order 
considerations of institutional design, such as the goal of democratic 
accountability”.122 According to Allan, a judge should not attempt to 
weigh first- and second-order (or content-dependent and content-
independent) considerations against each other. Instead, judges 
should decide according to their own judgment of the first-order 
considerations of substance in enforcing the heads of review, and 
take into account the authority’s conclusion only to the extent that it 
aids the judge’s own reasoning.123 
Allan is willing to concede that an authority’s superior 
expertise may be relevant, but on his account it is relevant only 
because, and to the extent that, the authority’s superior expertise 
makes it more likely to persuade the judge that its decision is correct 
or at least reasonable—ultimately, it remains for the court to assess 
the balance of first-order reasons.124 Likewise, on Allan’s account, 
deference is due on democratic grounds only because, and to the 
extent that, there is reasonable disagreement: “[I]n most 
circumstances, a variety of solutions will be consistent with respect 
for human rights. The court should accept whatever choice is 
made.”125 On this account, it is the court’s assessment of the range of 
                                                     
122 Allan, The Sovereignty of Law, note 104 above, p. 277. See also T.R.S. Allan, 
“Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 
C.L.J. 671, 688. For defences of the notion of due deference, see Hunt, 
“Sovereignty’s Blight”, note 65 above; Alison L. Young, “In Defence of Due 
Deference” (2009) 72 M.L.R. 554; Aileen Kavanagh, “Defending Deference in 
Public Law and Constitutional Theory” (2010) 126 L.Q.R. 222. 
123 Allan, The Sovereignty of Law, note 104 above, pp. 277–78; Allan, “Human 
Rights and Judicial Review”, note xxx above, p. 688; T.R.S. Allan, “Judicial 
Deference and Judicial Review: Legal Doctrine and Legal Theory” (2011) 127 
L.Q.R. 96, 100–1. 
124 Allan, The Sovereignty of Law, note 104 above, pp. 277–78; Allan, “Human 
Rights and Judicial Review”, note 122 above, pp. 690–91. 
125 Allan, “Human Rights and Judicial Review” note 122 above, p. 694. See also 
Allan, The Sovereignty of Law, note 104 above, pp. 279–85 
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reasonable decisions that determines the scope of the public 
authority’s discretion and therefore its jurisdiction.126 
Allan’s objection amounts to a denial of the pre-emptive 
force of a legitimate authority’s decision. He claims that all the 
grounds of judicial review, including reasonableness, establish 
jurisdictional boundaries, and it is therefore incoherent to claim that, 
in enforcing those grounds of review (and so establishing 
jurisdictional boundaries), the court should defer to the legitimate 
authority.127 Yet if a legitimate authority’s decision has pre-emptive 
force, reasonableness cannot be a test for jurisdiction, Recall that, 
according to the pre-emption thesis, a legitimate authority can only 
fulfil its valuable purpose—enabling its subjects to conform better 
with reason—if its subjects refrain from acting on their own 
judgment of the merits. Reasonableness review inevitably entails a 
judgment on the merits. It can therefore only be justified when there 
is some aspect of the case that deprives the agency of legitimate 
authority over that matter.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
That administrative authorities should never act against reason, our 
lawyers are agreed; but the doubt is of whose reason it is that shall be 
authoritative.128 It has become fashionable to defend what Etienne 
Mureinik called a “culture of justification”, in which “every exercise 
of power is expected to be justified”, in contrast with a “culture of 
authority”.129 A culture of authority sounds worse than a culture of 
justification, because it could be authoritarian. But let us not forget 
that there are good justifications for legitimate authority. Of course, 
we should not overlook the problem of illegitimate authority, of 
people claiming more authority than is justified. But that is precisely 
                                                     
126 Allan, “Judicial Deference and Judicial Review”, note 123 above, p. 102. See 
also T.R.S. Allan, “Deference, Defiance, and Doctrine: Defining the Limits of 
Judicial Review” (2010) 60 U.T.L.J. 41. 
127 See also Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference”, note 65 above, pp. 294, 298. 
128 Cf. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan [1651] (London 1968), ch 26: “That law can 
never be against reason, our lawyers are agreed … but the doubt is of whose reason 
it is that shall be received for law.” 
129 Etienne Mureinik, “A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” 
(1994) 10 South African Journal of Human Rights 31, 32. See also David 
Dyzenhaus, “Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik’s Conception of Legal 
Culture” (1998) 14 South African Journal of Human Rights” 11. 
This is an Accepted Manuscript, which may not include final edits. 
The final version will be published in (2017) 76 Cambridge Law 
Journal 
 
39 
why a doctrine of jurisdiction is so important. Any culture of 
justification, to be defensible, must allow for deference to an 
administrative agency acting within its jurisdiction, understood as the 
scope of its legitimate authority. 
This article has defended a theory of the structure of the 
reasoning that ought to determine an administrative agency’s 
jurisdiction, and therefore when a court is justified in intervening in 
administrative decision making. Returning one last time to Corner 
House, we can understand more clearly the way in which the 
Divisional Court and the House of Lords ought to have justified their 
respective conclusions. It was not enough for the Divisional Court to 
say that the decision about the necessity of surrendering to the threat 
was one for the court because of its responsibility to defend the rule 
of law. The court needed to explain why the court was better placed 
to balance the competing public interests, notwithstanding the good 
reasons for recognising the Director’s legitimate authority as a 
consequence of the statutory allocation of a wide discretionary 
power. On the other hand, the House of Lords should not have 
treated the statutory allocation as preventing the court from imposing 
the condition that the Divisional Court envisaged. Its judgment, like 
that if the Divisional Court, could have been improved by a better 
understanding of the nature and limits of legitimate authority. 
The argument of this article is not necessarily an argument 
for greater judicial deference, as such. It is an argument for greater 
judicial deference when the circumstances call for it. It is a defence 
of the distinction between questions of jurisdiction and the merits of 
the case, and an argument that, when a legitimate authority acts 
within its jurisdiction, the courts should follow the authority’s 
decision, in a sense, “blindly”, regardless of their view of the 
merits.130 Even Wednesbury unreasonableness is not an appropriate 
basis for intervening on the merits. The basis for the court’s 
intervention must be that the agency lacks legitimate authority—that 
is, that the court would conform better with reason by substituting its 
judgment for that of the agency, notwithstanding any claim to 
legitimate authority that the statutory allocation gives the agency. 
 
                                                     
130 Raz, The Authority of Law, note 30 above, p. 24: “One can be very 
watchful that it shall not overstep its authority and be sensitive 
to the presence of non-excluded considerations. But barring these 
possibilities, one is to follow the authority regardless of one’s 
view of the merits of the case (that is, blindly).” 
